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ABSTRACT
The design of secure and usable access schemes to personal
data represent a major challenge of online social networks
(OSNs). State of the art requires prior interaction to grant
access. Sharing with users who are not subscribed or pre-
viously have not been accepted as contacts in any case is
only possible via public posts, which can easily be abused
by automatic harvesting for user profiling, targeted spear-
phishing, or spamming. Moreover, users are restricted to the
access rules defined by the provider, which may be overly re-
strictive, cumbersome to define, or insufficiently fine-grained.
We suggest a complementary approach that can be eas-
ily deployed in addition to existing access control schemes,
does not require any interaction, and includes even public,
unsubscribed users. It exploits the fact that different social
circles of a user share different experiences and hence en-
crypts arbitrary posts. Hence arbitrary posts are encrypted,
such that only users with sufficient knowledge about the ow-
ner can decrypt.
Assembling only well-established cryptographic primitives,
we prove that the security of our scheme is determined by
the entropy of the required knowledge. We consequently
analyze the efficiency of an informed dictionary attack and
assess the entropy to be on par with common passwords.
A fully functional implementation is used for performance
evaluations, and available for download on the Web.
1. INTRODUCTION
Profiles and posts in Online Social Networks (OSN)
reveal a wealth of personal information about their own-
ers [1]. This is a common, and very immediate threat as
users still casually lose control over personal data like
addresses and even the state of their health. For in-
stance, compromising photos or personal opinions have
been abused for commercial 1 and criminal use 2. Fur-
thermore, automatic harvesting of profiles and posts by
Web servers in data centers yields large scale automatic
1
http://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf/news/post/334-young-people-
are-warned-they-may-lose-control-over-their-images-and-videos-
once-they-are-uploaded-online
2
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8789538/Most-
burglars-using-Facebook-and-Twitter-to-target-victims-survey-
suggests.html
access: directly at the database by the provider and in-
stitutional parties, through API calls by their affiliates,
or through simple Web crawlers of arbitrary, external
parties. Such mass retrieval amplifies the threats to
mass mailing-, phishing-, and scamming campaigns at
very large scales3.
The most common approach for ensuring explicit au-
dience selection is the use of access control mechanisms
by configuring provider-defined access rules. However,
this automatically denies access to non-members and
user who have not interacted within the OSN previ-
ously. In consequence, granting access to individuals
from the greater social community other than those
that explicitly are declared as friends within the OSN,
or the intransparent and uncontrolled set of “friends-
of-friends”, is solely possible by broadcasting a post
without any access restriction to the broad public. But
such public posts impose the enormous risk of access
by entirely unknown and unintended parties, predom-
inantly the afore-mentioned crawlers. Hence, sharing
exclusively with the extended social community of a
user is not sufficiently supported today.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we close this gap by presenting Partial
Knowledge-based Access Control (PKA), a non-inter-
active access control scheme that can be implemented
in addition to existing mechanisms. Its main purpose
is to protect public posts from unintended access by
unknown parties. No out-of-band key exchange is nec-
essary, allowing even friends that are not subscribed to
the OSN to access the posts.
The main idea is to encrypt the post using attribute
values that are easy to guess for members of a user’s
social community, yet difficult for strangers and during
automated access. As in general even a member of this
community may not have knowledge of all values, such
a requirement would be too strict in most cases. In-
stead our scheme provides a higher level of flexibility:
For each post, the publisher can individually choose n
3
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/10/31/dodgy_brokering_
facebook_data/
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attributes as well as the number of attributes a user has
to know to access the posts.
We describe a concrete instantiation based on es-
tablished cryptographic mechanisms. We prove that
if these mechansims are secure, the security of PKA
is completely determined by the entropy of the chosen
attributes.
Based on data, we acquired from well-known OSNs
and the German statistical office, we find that, even
under an advanced and informed dictionary attack, on
the order of hundreds of millions of potential attribute
combinations have to be tested on average to access
profiles that are protected with PKA. This is about the
same order of effort as it is needed to break passwords
[2, 3].
Hence, our scheme protects against common attack-
ers such as scammers and spammers, as well as against
casual data loss, and leaks by the provider and gov-
ernmental agencies. Observe that, depending on the
particular use case, the owner may choose attributes of
higher entropy, which are harder or virtually impossible
to guess for anybody. In fact, the traditional approach
of encrypting a post using a shared secret key can be
seen as a special case of our approach.
We provide a fully functional Firefox extension for
Facebook posts as a prototype, for public download.
Locally storing the attribute-value pairs that are used
as secrets once they are provided, the profiles containing
protected posts can be accessed repeatedly without the
need for repeated entry. The overhead of the crypto-
graphic scheme is barely perceived by a legitimate user,
yet delays unauthorized access by several days, render-
ing automatic harvesting by both external parties and
social network providers economically unviable.
Section 2 covers the state of the art. We describe the
general framework of our approach and give a formal
security definition in Section 3. Afterwards, we explain
a concrete realization in Section 4. Its security and
analysis are analyzed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively,
and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. RELATEDWORK
OSN privacy is constantly raising broad interest, and
recent years have seen various contributions aiming at
preserving it. The approaches differ by their assumed
trust model and the adversaries they aim to defend
against.
Decentralized social networks, like for instance Vis-
a-Vis [4], diaspora 4, and Safebook [5] have been pro-
posed to circumvent the existence of a centralized in-
stance that has a global overview of all subscribers, as
well as ubiquitous control. These systems require mi-
gration from current services, additionally, their lack
of acceptance, partially caused by their lack of com-
4
http://joindiaspora.com
petitive functionality and performance, have prevented
broad application, so far.
Focusing on confidentiality of content rather than
anonymity or unobservability, and thus accepting that
acts of communication as well as their participators
can be observed by the social network provider, a sec-
ond class of approaches encrypts content and leverages
the conventional service for its exchange. NOYB [6] as
one of the earliest approaches introduces dictionaries
to replace the real with seemingly random attributes.
The correct mapping is shared with authorized con-
tacts, who hence are capable of retrieving the plaintext.
This mapping can be retrieved by the social networking
provider, too, though, when acting on behalf of a user’s
friend. Persona [7] and EASiER [8] employ attribute-
based encryption and offer fine grained, personalized
access rules to different parts of the profile. The Fire-
fox extension Scramble! [9] offers item-specific access
rules over multiple social networking sites, but again re-
quires the user to explicitly define friendship relations
in several social networks.
Facebook indeed has started to prevent sharing of en-
crypted content by transcoding image files and restrict-
ing free-text attribute fields. Some recent approaches
hence suggest the exchange of encrypted content via
third party storage, using the OSN only for exchange of
references to the encrypted content [10, 11, 12, 13]. Al-
ternatively, the transmission of encrypted content can
be hidden [14]. All these approaches require interaction
for explicit authorization on a per-user base and key
exchange.
Approaches that aim at preventing unnoticed access
by unintended parties again differ in the adversary they
assume. PoX [15] is a plugin that illustrates which in-
formation is provided to third-party applications. It
additionally offers the possibility to restrict access of
these parties to selected profile entries. Our goal differs
from theirs: they do not actually want to hide content
from general, unintended audiences, but rather enable
the user to consciously decide which data is accessed
by application providers. CAPTCHAs indeed serve the
purpose of preventing automated mass retrieval, but
they allow access to arbitrary human individuals that
can solve the challenge, thus not only to trusted parties.
In a similar fashion, text in OSNs can be distorted to
protect against automatic processing [16]. Using per-
sonal knowledge of and about a user to complement
keys and passphrases is leveraged by social authentica-
tion5 to prevent illegitimate login to accounts. Both
CAPTCHAs and social authentication are aimed at ad-
versaries external to the service, though, and thus fail
to prevent unintended access by the provider and its
affiliates.
In summary, there are various protection schemes
5
http://www.facebook.com/blog/blog.php?post=486790652130
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that can be used to enhance privacy in OSNs. In gen-
eral, they require explicit audience selection, which is
desired in case of highly sensitive data. However, these
access rules exclude non-members and may either be
overly restrictive or entail over-sharing due to the het-
erogeneous contacts summarized under the common term
friends or friends-of-friends.
3. FRAMEWORK
In this section, we first give a short, informal overview
of our requirements for a knowledge-based access scheme
for (public) posts. Afterwards, the required functional-
ities are formalized, as are our security goals.
3.1 Intended Use
The main goal of our scheme is to protect public post
from automatic harvesting. Furthermore, it can also be
used to obfuscate information from the social network
provider, its affiliates, and curious strangers. However,
these might have additional knowledge about a user, so
that our security analysis in Section 5.2 does not di-
rectly apply. The posts of a user should be readable
by any person sharing enough experience with the re-
spective user, regardless of prior interaction within the
social network. Because even non-members can access
the posts, but not arbitrary strangers, the peer pressure
to join a social network for retrieving important infor-
mation is reduced. Furthermore, it is not necessarily
to enlist all people that a user wants to share infor-
mation with as friends, or sort them into categories,
potentially risking confrontation in case of a perceived
misclassification. Information can simply be posted as
public according to the provided access rules, and be
encrypted with our scheme to prevent strangers, espe-
cially crawlers for user profiling and spamming, from
accessing the data.
Because our scheme is intended to overcome the prob-
lems of cumbersome explicit audience selection, trans-
parency and revocation are not considered. If desired,
they can be provided by additional access rules. For
example, a post can be published within the friends or
members group, so that it simply restricts the access to
those contacts within the OSN, who indeed know the
publisher well.
3.2 Functionality
On a high level, PKA allows to transform a post p
into a protected post c based on a set of attributes
(a1, . . . , an), where each attribute ai = (di, vi) is com-
posed of an attribute description di and an attribute
value vi. For example, an attribute description could
be ’Name’ and an attribute value ’John’. In particu-
lar two different attributes a 6= a′ may share the same
attribute description, e.g., ’Name’, but have different
values ’John’ and ’Jane’. Vice versa, two distinct at-
tributes can have different descriptions, but the same
value. A protected post c is published together with
the used attribute descriptions d1, . . . , dn, and the pa-
rameters n and t. Only users who know at least t out of
these n attribute values are able to recover the original
post p from the protected post c.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the following
that the values t and n with t ≤ n are fixed and publicly
known. Let P be the set of posts, W be the set of
attributes a, V the set of attribute values v, and C be
the set of all protected posts c.
The main components of PKA are the two mech-
anisms PROTECT and ACCESS , which allow users
to protect their posts and access the posts of another
known user, respectively. They are formally defined in
Algorithm 1. PROTECT takes a post p ∈ P and n val-
ues for generating the protected post c. The operation
ACCESS maps t values and the protected post c to a
post p˜. In case that at least t values correctly corre-
spond to the values used for protecting post p, p˜ = p
is correctly retrieved, and a random post p˜ is returned
otherwise.
PROTECT : Vn × P → C, ((v1, . . . , vn), p) 7→ c
ACCESS : Vt × {1, . . . , n}t × C → P,
((v˜i1 , . . . , v˜it ), (i1, . . . , it), c) 7→ p˜
where c = PROTECT((v1, . . . , vn), p)
and i1, . . . , it distinct
p˜ =
{
p, if v˜ij = vij for j = 1 . . . t
a random r ∈ P, otherwise
Algorithm 1: Basic Functionalities
3.3 Security Goals
Next, we formalize the notion of security for PKA.
As confidentiality of the post content is the primary se-
curity goal, we adopt an established security notion for
symmetric encryption schemes: indistinguishability un-
der chosen-plaintext attack (cf. [17]). This is modelled
by the following game involving an attacker A and an
hypothetical entity named oracle O:
Step 1: O samples an n-tuple (a1, . . . , an) ∈ W with
ai = (di, vi) according to some distribution D and
hands the attribute descriptions (d1, . . . , dn) to A.
Step 2: A generates two different posts p0 6= p1 (of
same length) and gives these to O.
Step 3: O flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, returns c =
PROTECT((ai, vi)
n
i=1, pb) to A.
Step 4: A outputs a bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
The attacker A wins the game if b = b∗. W.l.o.g., we
can assume that Pr[b = b∗] ≥ 1/2.6 Observe that a sim-
6If this is not the case we consider a modified adversary A
who simply invokes A and returns the complement b∗ of the
output of A.
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Figure 1: Overview of PKA as described in Section 4
ple attack is to pick a random bit for b∗, independent
of c, yielding a winning chance of 1/2. Hence the ad-
vantage AdvA of A is defined by how much the success
probability deviates from 1/2:
AdvA := Pr[b = b∗]− 1/2. (1)
Here the probability is taken over all random coins of O
and A. Security is then characterized by the maximum
advantage taken over all adversaries:
Definition 3.1 (Security). A PKA-scheme is
(τ, ε)-secure if it holds for all adversaries A with a run-
time ≤ τ that AdvA ≤ ε.
Remark 3.2. Observe that in the security game, we
allow an attacker to see the chosen attribute descrip-
tions before it has to choose the two posts p0 6= p1. This
is in compliance with the common approach to make an
adversary as strong as possible. On the other hand, we
disallow to influence the choice of the attributes. This
has several reasons. First, the attributes can be seen
as the analogon to the encryption key in symmetric en-
cryption schemes. Second, the security definition should
also cover cases where the distribution D is not (or only
partially known) to A. Third, in case that D has a low
entropy, this is reflected accordingly in the success prob-
ability of A.
4. A CONCRETE REALIZATION
In this section, we propose a concrete realization of
the PKA-concept suggested in Section 3. Our scheme
combines established cryptographic primitives:
• a block cipher (Enc,Dec) with key space K =
{0, 1}κ, which encrypts messages (i.e. posts) from
P = {0, 1}b to ciphertexts in C = P,7
7Remark that fixing the length b of the posts is only done to
keep the following description simple. If longer posts need
to be encrypted, one can easily adapt the scheme to use the
block cipher in an appropriate mode of operation.
• a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → K, and
• a a secret sharing scheme SSS, consisting of two
functions: SSS-CREATE creates shares s1, . . . , sn ∈
K out of a secret S ∈ K, and S is reconstructed
from t shares by SSS-RECONSTRUCT .
In a nutshell, the block cipher is used to encrypt the
post using a randomly sampled key K. Using the se-
cret sharing scheme, the key K is split into n shares
such that any t shares are sufficient for reconstructing
K. Each share gets encrypted (using the same block
cipher) under individual keys, which are derived from
the attribute values vi and the hash function.
More formally, during the preparation phase attributes
a1, . . . , an as well as integers n and t are chosen. We
assume them to be publicly known, e.g. by attaching
them to the protected post.
When a user executes PROTECT((v1, . . . , vn), p) for
protecting a post p, a master key K is uniformly sam-
pled and p is encrypted to c = Enc(K, p). Using the se-
cret sharing scheme, n shares (s1, . . . , sn) subsequently
are generated from K, and the shares si are encrypted
to ci = Enc(H(vi), si) based on the hashes H(vi) of
the given attribute values vi. The encrypted post c is
published together with the encrypted shares ci.
When executing the function ACCESS to retrieve the
content of an encrypted post c, users provide values v˜ij
for t of the n attributes. Based on these values, the en-
crypted shares are then retrieved as follows: for each in-
dex ij , the value H(v˜ij ) is computed and afterwards the
share s˜ij := Dec(H(v˜ij ), sij ) is decrypted. A potential
key K˜ is obtained from the shares s˜ij by SSSreconstruct
and the encrypted post is decrypted, i.e. p˜ = Dec(K˜, c).
If the values v˜ij have all been correct, then the correct
shares sij have been determined, the value K˜ is equal to
K and in particular p˜ = p. Otherwise, that is if at least
one of the values v˜ij have been wrong, the correspond-
ing value s˜ij is wrong with high probability (if the hash
function is secure). Due to the properties of the secret
sharing scheme, a wrong value K˜ is computed and p˜
will be just a random b-bit string. Both algorithms are
displayed in Alg. 2. A formal security analysis is given
in the next Section.
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section starts with a proof that the security of
the scheme relies purely on the entropy of the selected
attributes (if the underlying cryptographic primitives
are secure). As a consequence, we analyze a dictionary
attack based on the entropy of selected social network
data.
5.1 Proof of Security
In this section, we provide an upper bound on the
advantage of an attacker. Recall that only established
4
PROTECT
INPUT: (v1, ..., vn) ∈ Vn, p ∈ P
Sample K ∈ K
Encrypt c = Enc(K,m)
(s1, ..., sn) = SSS-CREATE(K)
Compute Ki = H(vi) for i = 1..n
Encrypt ci = Enc(Ki, si) for i = 1..n
OUTPUT: (c, c1, ..., cn) ∈ C
ACCESS :
INPUT: (v˜i1 , . . . , v˜it ) ∈ Vt, (i1, . . . , it),
cp = (c, ..., cn) = PROTECT((v1, ..., vn), p)
Compute K˜ij = H(v˜ij ) for j = 1..t
Decrypt s˜ij = Dec(K˜ij , cij ) for j = 1..t
K˜ = SSS-RECONSTRUCT(s˜i1 , ...s˜it )
p˜ = Dec(K˜, c) =
{
p, if v˜ij = vij for j = 1..t
a random r ∈ P, otherwise
OUTPUT: p˜ ∈ P
Algorithm 2: PROTECT and ACCESS of the proposed
concrete realization.
cryptographic primitives, i.e. block cipher, hash func-
tion, and secret sharing scheme, are deployed. For each
of these concrete realizations are known, which are ei-
ther secure according to the current state of knowl-
edge, e.g. the block cipher standard AES and the hash
function standard SHA-3, or can even be mathemati-
cally proven to be secure, e.g. Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. Hence, to keep the analysis simple, we assume
that these schemes are ideally realized. More precisely,
we assume in the following that (i) the block cipher
is a random permutation, (ii) the hash function is a
random oracle, and (iii) the secret sharing scheme is
information-theoretically secure. Moreover, we make
the attacker somewhat stronger by considering for the
time effort only the number q of queries it makes to the
ideal cipher and/or the random oracle.8
The main theorem is the following:
Theorem 5.1. It holds for any adversary A that makes
at most q queries to the ideal cipher and/or the random
oracle that
AdvA ≤ 3q|K| + Pr[Ev]. (2)
Here Ev denotes the event that A correctly identifies for
the given attribute descriptions (d1, . . . , dn) (see Sec. 3)
at least t attribute values.
Proof.
A knows the encrypted post c, the encrypted shares
c1, ..., cn, and the attribute descriptions (d1, . . . , dn).
Let Emk denote the event that during the attack, the
8We stress that these assumptions are only made to keep the
analysis simple. In fact, the analysis could easily be adapted
to the case that the deployed block cipher and hash function
are ”only” computationally secure.
attacker made a query to the block cipher using the cor-
rect key. In the ideal cipher model, c is equally likely
to be an encryption of p0 and p1 if ¬Emk. Hence
AdvA = Pr[b = b∗]− 1/2
= Pr[b = b∗|Emk] · Pr[Emk]
+ Pr[b = b∗|¬Emk] · Pr[¬Emk]− 1/2
≤ 1 · Pr[Emk] + 1/2 · 1− 1/2 = Pr[Emk].
Thus, the advantage of A is equivalent to the probabil-
ity Pr[Emk] of deriving the master key K. Let s1, . . . , sn
denote the shares, which encode the key K. Let Es
denote the event that the attacker successfully recon-
structed at least t from these n shares. Then it holds
Pr[Emk] = Pr[Emk|Es] · Pr[Es] + Pr[Emk|¬Es] · Pr[¬Es]
≤ Pr[Es] + q/|K|
The second term follows from the fact that Pr[Emk|¬Es] ≤
q/|K|. The reason is that if the attacker did not re-
cover sufficient shares, it follows from the information-
theoretic security of the secret sharing scheme that the
attacker cannot derive any information about K, which
he did not know before. Thus, the only remaining op-
tion in this case is to coincidentally query the block ci-
pher with the correct key. This is successful with prob-
ability at most q/|K|.
Next, we consider Pr[Es]. Recall that the attacker
only knows the encryption of the shares, being ci =
Enc(H(vi), si) for the selected attribute values vi. Let
hi := H(vi) denote their hash values. We denote by Eh
the event that the attacker correctly identified at least
t hash values hi. It follows that
Pr[Es] = Pr[Es|Eh] · Pr[Eh] + Pr[Es|¬Eh] · Pr[¬Eh]
≤ 1 · Pr[Eh] + q/|K|.
The rationale behind the second term is similar to above:
if an attacker does not know all keys that have been used
to encrypt the shares, the best he can do is to guess the
remaining ones.
Finally, an upper bound for Pr[Eh] is derived. Let
Ev denote the event that the attacker identified at least
t values vi correctly. Using the same line of arguments,
it follows that
Pr[Eh] ≤ Pr[Ev] + q/|K|.
Assembling all results yields the claim.
Theorem 5.1 shows that if a reasonable key size, e.g.,
128 bits, are chosen, the advantage of an attacker is
dominated by the probability of an attacker of cor-
rectly guessing sufficiently many attribute values. Con-
sequently, we consider in the remainder of this section
a dictionary attack for guessing these values based on
real-world data and distributions for the evaluation.
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5.2 Dictionary Attack Evaluation
Having proven that the security depends solely on
the probability of determining the chosen values, dic-
tionary attacks that aim to guess those values are the
foremost vulnerability for PKA. We consequently ana-
lyze the feasibility of a dictionary attack based on real-
world data. Note that this analysis is only valid for au-
tomated attacks, most commonly executed by crawlers.
The scheme is vulnerable to social engineering attacks,
which invest time in retrieving information about the
person from out-of-band sources. However, such attacks
have a high cost, and are not scalable. Recall that an
attacker cannot tell from the fact that he chooses incor-
rect values, which values have been correct, if any, and
which incorrect. Consequently, an unsuccessful attack
without additional information about the publisher re-
veals only that at least n− t values are incorrect. The
information gain is negligible, due to the vast number
of possible attribute-value combinations. The dictio-
nary attack works as follows: an attacker A uses a basis
distribution DB of attribute values and aims to guess
attribute values which have been sampled according to
a (possibly unknown) target distribution DT . Based on
DB , A then tries all possible sets of t values in descend-
ing order of likelihood. For each guess, a corresponding
key candidate K˜ is computed and the encrypted post
decrypted using K˜. We assume that A can distinguish
correct and incorrect decryptions, since it is easy to rec-
ognize real language from randomly generated charac-
ter strings. Hence, A continues testing different sets of
values until the encrypted post is correctly decrypted.
In the following, we refer by ADBt (DT ) to an attacker
on a t-of-4 scheme with target distribution DT , using
basis distribution DB . Two metrics are important for
measuring A’s efficiency: the fraction of protected posts
that can be accessed using these predefined values, and
the cost, meaning the number of trials, A has to invest
to find the correct values.
Datasets and Distributions.
We use two available datasets to analyze the efficiency
of possible attacks: the first was obtained from meinVZ,
a German OSN with strong similarities to Facebook
[18], the other from the German business-oriented social
network XING [19].
Both datasets contain the attributes descriptions ’first
name’, ’second name’, ’home town’, ’ZIP’ and ’univer-
sity’. We chose the 266, 804 profiles that contain all con-
sidered attributes from the entire set of 702.986 profiles
in meinVZ, and analogously 42, 475 profiles of the over-
all 756, 400 profiles in XING respectively. Since ’home-
town’ and ’ZIP’ are redundant, we use ’hometown’ only,
especially as the majority of users decided not to enter
their ZIP in XING. To increase the attacker’s chances,
we preprocessed the data sets by by adding variants
Basic Distribution 1st Name 2nd Name Uni Town
SB 1878 3422 568 688
meinVZ 23139 98013 2861 52989
XING 4590 24305 16423 4686
Table 1: Number of values for each dataset
of attribute values, for example ’Uni’ instead of ’uni-
versity’. We additionally obtain the overall German
statistics as published by the German statistical office
9 (henceforth denoted SB).
For our analysis, we assume that each profile contains
a post protected with these four respective attributes
and that these attributes are independent. Note that in-
formation on hometown and university may be publicly
available and hence unsuitable choices for the attributes
in reality, so they are just used for the purpose of our
evaluation for the lack of other data. However, names,
places, and institutions are frequently associated with
a common past history (name of the favorite teacher,
the destination of a school trip, ...), so the respective
distributions provide a meaningful analysis of at least a
common subset of attribute types.
In the following, DT (meinVZ) and DT (XING) denote
target distributions, and DB(meinVZ) and DB(XING)
denote the basic distributions obtained from meinVZ
and XING by considering each attribute distribution
independently. For the basis distribution, we calculate
the frequency distributions of the attribute values for
meinVZ, XING and SB, respectively. Table 1 displays
the number of different attribute values for each data
set.
The order of likelihood is evaluated as follows: For
a fixed attribute description, a possible attribute value
has rank r with regard to the basis distribution DB if
it is the r-th most likely value according to distribu-
tion DB . Hence, for given attribute descriptions d =
(d1, . . . , dt), the rank of a possible assignment of at-
tribute values v = (v1, . . . , vt) is estimated as the prod-
uct of the ranks of the individual vi’s, that is rank(v) is
estimated by
∏n
i=1 rank(vi). Note that this is a lower
bound. We compute estimates only, since it is computa-
tionally demanding to compute and store a distribution
over several billions of values.
Success rate.
For a set of posts, a basis distribution DB and a
threshold t, the success rate is given by the fraction
of posts that can be accessed. The fractions of acces-
sible posts for each set of posts and each distribution
are given in Table 2. Naturally, an attacker of the form
ADB(OSN)t (DT (OSN)) can access all posts as the basis
distribution contains all attribute values occurring in
the target distribution. Moreover, as expected the suc-
9
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Startseite.html
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Basic Distribution
Target Dist. t SB meinVZ XING
meinVZ
1 0.6390 1.0 0.9714
2 0.1923 1.0 0.8172
3 0.0162 1.0 0.4804
4 0.0 1.0 0.1339
XING
1 0.7968 0.9973 1.0
2 0.3612 0.9604 1.0
3 0.0543 0.6880 1.0
4 0.0 0.0746 1.0
Table 2: Fraction of accessed posts for different distri-
butions
 0
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 1  10  100  1000  10000  100000  1e+06  1e+07
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Target: Xing, Basis: Xing
Figure 2: Number of needed trials vs. fraction of ac-
cessed posts for a 3-of-4 scheme
cess rate is the lowest if using DB(SB) as DB(SB) con-
tains less values than the other basis distributions. Even
with a threshold of t = 1, ADB(SB)1 (DT (meinVZ)) only
has a success rate of 64 %, whereasADB(SB)1 (DT (XING))
has a success rate of about 80 %. This means that a
considerable fraction of the users did not enter a single
value that exists in official statistics. The success rate
decreases rapidly with increasing t, so that for t = 4,
no post can be accessed.
Using a basic distribution crawled from a different
OSN, more than 80% of the posts can be accessed us-
ing a 1-of-4 or 2-of-4 secret sharing scheme. However,
when requiring all 4 attributes, we have a success rate
of 7.46 % for ADB(XING)4 (DT (meinVZ)) and of 13.39 %
for ADB(meinVZ)4 (DT (XING)), respectively. So, as ex-
pected, for both SB and OSN basic distributions, the
success rate decreases enormously when increasing t.
Though a considerable number of posts can be accessed
with a threshold of 1 or 2, less than 15 % of the posts
can be accessed with t ≥ 3.
Mean Number of Trials.
The mean cost of an attack is given as the estimated
number of trials, averaged over all posts, with regard
to a basic distribution DB and a threshold t. Table 3
details the average cost together with the standard devi-
ation. In case of DB(SB), the cost for t = 1 . . . 3 lies on
the order of at least 1011 while the cost for 4-of-4 equals
the number of possible combinations (about 2 ∗ 1012),
because no post can be accessed. Nevertheless, this
is lower than the cost for ADB(meinVZ)t (DT (XING)) and
ADB(XING)t (DT (meinVZ)) for t = 1 . . . 4. The reason for
this lies again in the lower number of values considered
by the SB basic distribution. In both cases, the cost is
at least on the order of 1014, even for t = 1. The cost
when using XING as a basic distribution and meinVZ
as a target distribution is lower than in the opposite
case, due to the fact that DB(SB) considers less values.
In case of an attack of the form ADB(OSN)t (DT (OSN)),
the cost is considerably reduced (see Table 3).
Payoff Success vs. Invested Time.
The mean cost is only of limited value, especially
since the standard deviation is high. An adversary is
more interested in minimizing the effort for maximum
success. Hence, A will only try a certain number of val-
ues before aborting and trying a different post. This
allows us to compare different distributions with regard
to their efficiency. Figure 2 displays the effort in terms
of needed of trials versus the likelihood of accessing a
post using up to 107 trials (for higher values the increase
is barely noticeable). Indeed, the curves have a strong
increase in the beginning, as expected. Using the same
basic and target distribution is more efficient than us-
ing data from a different OSN. However, the latter still
produces a higher success rate for any number of trials
than the SB distribution. This is due to the frequent
use of inofficial names in profiles, such as storing the
nickname as a users first name. Figure 2 indicates that
XING posts can be accessed within a lower number of
trials, at least for t = 3. A plausible reason is that
XING is addressed to professionals, meaning users in
general use less inofficial names, so having more com-
mon attribute values and a smaller set of values.
Summary.
For a threshold t = 3, at least 100 million trials are
needed in average to access a post. Though this can
be realized, it is not within the computational power of
a spammer or an advertisement company, providing a
good security against this kind of adversary. Moreover,
the entropy of our scheme seems to be similar to that
of actual selected passwords [2, 3].
Recall that our analysis assumes that values with a
low entropy are chosen. As proven in Th. 5.1, the se-
curity depends solely on the entropy of the selected at-
tribute values. That is already a 1-of-1 scheme with an
arbitrary character string as value is secure, meaning
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Basic Distribution
Target Dist. t SB meinVZ XING
meinVZ
1 9.06E11 ± 1.21E12 6.53E01 ± 1.52E02 2.45E14 ± 1.43E15
2 2.03E12 ± 9.90E11 1.14E05 ± 9.73E05 1.57E15 ± 3.32E15
3 2.47E12 ± 3.17E11 2.24E09 ± 2.98E10 4.46E15 ± 4.29E15
4 2.51E12 ± 0.00E00 1.30E14 ± 1.93E15 7.44E15 ± 2.92E15
XING
1 5.10E11 ± 1.01E12 9.15E14 ± 1.77E16 4.98E01 ± 2.01E02
2 1.60E12 ± 1.21E12 1.36E16 ± 6.70E16 8.27E04 ± 6.75E05
3 2.37E12 ± 5.69E11 1.07E17 ± 1.59E17 5.84E08 ± 6.13E09
4 2.51E12 ± 0.00E00 3.18E17 ± 9.03E16 9.13E12 ± 1.06E14
Table 3: Mean number of trials needed to access a post using a dictionary attack for three distinct value distributions
(E notation)
it is not possible to determine the protected content.
In this fashion, our scheme could be used in the same
way as traditional encryption, providing the same guar-
antees as any well-established cryptographic primitives.
At the end, it is up to the concrete scenario to choose a
balance between security and probability that a legiti-
mate user can determine the requested attribute values.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
To give proof of our concept, we implemented PKA,
employing Shamir’s secret sharing [20], AES-256, and
the SHA-256 hash function, as a Firefox extension in
JavaScript. It is available for download 10 and it can
be used to publish protected posts in Facebook notes,
through a simple graphical user interface. We evaluate
the performance of our implementation of PKA with re-
gard to the overhead for key generation, encryption and
decryption. The evaluation shows that the overhead is
negligible for an informed user, but prohibitive for an
adversary.
6.1 Extension Description
The extension directly implements the PROTECT
and ACCESS functions. More precisely, the interface
provides input methods to share and retrieve protected
posts, including the definition of the parameters n and t.
It further allows for addition, modification, and deletion
of attribute-value pairs, which are stored locally. The
interface of the extension is defined using XUL, and all
algorithms are implemented in JavaScript, relying on
existing, verified libraries. All message exchange lever-
ages the Facebook developer API, and the messages are
encoded as JSON objects.
Upon input of a note for protection as well as the cor-
responding attribute-value pairs and parameters, the
extension executes PROTECT . Attribute-value pairs
can be defined in the interface (see Fig. 3). In order to
publish a protected post, several attribute-value pairs
can be chosen, and the cleartext of the post is entered
(see Fig. 4).
The extension then encrypts the post and publishes
10
http://www.p2p.tu-darmstadt.de/research/PKA/
the ciphertext within Facebook as a note, together with
the encrypted shares and the attribute information. A
PRNG provided by the Gibson Research Corporation11
is used for generating a 256 bit key K. Encryption is
done using the AES-256 implementation of the Cryp-
toJS library12 in CBC mode, and the SHA-256 imple-
mentation from the same library is used for hashing. K
is split applying Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, which
leverages the fact that a polynomial of degree t − 1 is
uniquely identified by at least, but not less than t eval-
uations. We implement the finite field GF (28) within
our extension, and the secret is split into packets of 8
bits, each representing an element in GF (28). For each
of these packets, shares are computed and their con-
catenation then is encrypted using AES.
Upon access of a protected post, the user is presented
with the requested attributes and can enter the values
in corresponding text fields (see Fig. 6). A key is then
constructed, and the post decrypted. In case the in-
put values are entered correctly, the original post is dis-
played, otherwise the AES decryption yields the UTF-8
representation of the attempted decryption (cmp. Fig.
8 resp. Fig. 5). Attribute-value pairs both of the user
and previously accessed protected posts are stored on
the machine of the user only, using Mozilla’s SQLite
API.
6.2 Performance Evaluation
In order to test the applicability of our extension,
we evaluate its performance on key generation as well
as en- and decryption. We subsequently measure the
time needed to access protected posts both for informed
users and uninformed attackers, based on the analysis
in Section 5.
Our measurements are performed on an average dual
core PC with 3.00 GHz, 3.50 GB main memory and
Windows 7 64 bit as operating system. Results are
averaged over 100 runs and presented including their
standard deviation. The duration of cryptographic op-
erations depends on the total number of attributes n,
11
https://www.grc.com/otg/uheprng.htm
12
http://groups.google.com/group/crypto-js/topics
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Figure 7: Time in ms needed for a) share generation and encryption for various t-of-n schemes, b) AES en-/decryption
with given K for posts between 1 KB and 10 MB (log-log), c) total time for access for n = 20 and various thresholds
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Figure 3: Dialog for managing attributes
the number of attributes needed to access the post t, as
well as the post size.
We vary the number of shares n between 1 and 20,
whereas t is chosen between 1 and n. The following
elementary operations are evaluated:
1. generation of keys (including share generation and
encryption)
2. encryption and decryption of a post with known
K
3. reconstruction of K from the encrypted shares.
The total time for access is the sum of key reconstruc-
tion and the decryption. We evaluate the en-/decryption
cost for posts of sizes 1 KB to 10 MB, where the user
input is chosen as random UTF-8 character strings.
Key generation.
The key generation consists of the generation of the
master key K, the generation of the (t−1)-degree poly-
nomial p, the calculation of n shares and their encryp-
tion. Generating the master key takes 11.61 ms on
average, with a standard deviation of 0.17 ms. Fig.
Figure 4: Dialog for protecting a note
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Figure 5: A protected note, the attributes, and the ac-
cessed content displayed by the extension
Figure 6: Dialog for accessing a note
7a displays the measured times needed for share gen-
eration and encryption for n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10} and
t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
The time for generation and encryption indeed in-
creases linearly with the number of attributes and the
number of shares, but it remains below 15 ms for t = 1
in all experiments. Increasing the threshold to 5 shares,
the time ranges from 13.67 ms (n = 5) to 16.47 ms
(n = 10). In case of 20 shares, the average time for a
5-of-20 scheme is 25.78 ms, but increases to 42.86 ms
when a threshold of 20 is used. In general, key genera-
tion and share encryption takes less than 45 ms, even in
case of a scheme with 20 shares, which seems unlikely
high for realistic cases.
The key generation, secret sharing, and share encryp-
tion hence takes too little time to even be perceived by
the user.
En-/Decryption with known K.
We measure the duration of en-/decryption for posts
sizes increasing by a factor 10 in each step. Fig. 7b in-
dicates that the duration indeed increases linearly. The
increase from 1 KB to 10 KB is slightly lower than in
the other cases. The reason for this deviation is the
fact that initial function call and processing the results
demand a constant overhead independent of the size of
the post. In case of pure textual posts the size is un-
likely to exceed 100 KB13, in which case the encryption
takes well below 35 ms. Even in case of a hypotheti-
cal 10 MB post, including several photos for example,
the encryption takes only slightly over 3s, which is on
the order of time that downloading the same amount
of data takes as well. Note that the median latency
of accessing a webpage by a Desktop browser has been
found to be 65 ms in 2012 14, which is higher than the
sum of key generation and encryption cost for realistic
post sizes.
Key reconstruction.
Reconstructing K is expected to depend on t for de-
crypting the shares and performing the interpolation.
Fig. 7c displays the total time needed for accessing
a post at various post sizes. These include the time
for key reconstruction and decryption, and the former
can be derived by subtracting the decryption time as
measured above. The master key thus is reconstructed
in less than 8 ms at t ≤ 3, which we argue to be realistic
in practice. The time for key reconstruction remains
below 20 ms up to a threshold of 14, and even for t = 20
only roughly 30 ms are needed.
Total Time to Access.
13
Note that Facebook notes are limited to a length of 65535 characters,
yielding a maximum size of 128 KB UTF-8 encoded text.
14
http://www.webperformancetoday.com/2012/04/02/mobile-versus-
desktop-latency/
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For PKA to be accepted, the total time for accessing
a post is most critical. This is due to the facts that
1. PROTECT is only executed once per post, while
ACCESS is executed by everyone interested in the
post, and
2. an attacker accessing a protected post has to ex-
pect a delay of the number of needed trials times
the average time for decryption.
Hence, accessing a post should be fast enough not to
decrease the quality of service for a legitimate user, but
make it unprofitable for an attacker to attempt gaining
access.
Fig. 7c displays the total time access, consisting
of key reconstruction and decryption, for various post
sizes. It indicates that for small post sizes, the time for
share retrieval increases noticeable with the threshold.
A threshold of t = 20 takes around 10 times as long
as threshold t = 1 (for a post size of 1 KB). The ac-
cess time, however, generally remains on the order of
hundreds of ms, and the delay of regular access is not
noticeable. In case of large posts exceeding 1 MB, the
delay of the key reconstruction is negligibly in compari-
son with the decryption, regardless of the secret sharing
parameters.
Legitimate users may need several attempts on the
first try until the correct values have been entered, of
course. This is inevitable since a lot of values are bound
to have synonyms. Assuming that such synonyms are
few and that users carefully choose their values, we ex-
pect that a maximum of 10 combinations will have to
be tested. With content amounting to sizes of several
kilobytes, the total access time is still on the order of
one second. The actual perceived overhead by the user
hence clearly will be dominated by the time to man-
ually select values for attributes, rather than the time
needed by the processing of the extension. However,
this cost is only applicable for the first trial of a user’s
keys. Assuming that attributes are frequently reused
for protecting posts, all later posts are automatically
decrypted by the extension, so that the latency is only
that of the cryptographic operations, which is 31 ms for
a 3-of-4 scheme and a post of 100 KB.
An uninformed attacker needs to consecutively guess
attribute values, decrypt the shares, reconstruct candi-
dates for K, and apply the decryption algorithm. Sim-
plifying the estimation, we consider only the time needed
to retrieve the shares, since the decryption depends on
the size of the post. The results above show that in a
3-of-4 scheme, which seems realistic, a trial to retrieve
the shares takes about 7.98 ms in average. Consult-
ing the results from Section 5.2, we can estimate the
time the attacker needs to successfully gain access to a
post. Using the data sets meinVZ and XING, as de-
scribed in Section 5.2, we consider value distributions
Figure 8: Interaction between user, extension and Face-
book
derived from both OSNs as well as from the German
statistical office (SB). Note that on average at least 54
days are needed to successfully access a protected post,
for all considered basic and target distributions pairs.
Since an attacker is not likely to test for all possible
attributes, let us assume that he will try likely combi-
nations for a minute, before turning to the next post.
We see that, even in the case that the ground truth is
known, the attacker is incapable of accessing about 90
% of the posts within one minute. The actual distribu-
tion, however, is not known to the attacker in reality.
The best chance of the attacker is to assume that the
distributions comply to corresponding official statistics.
Considering the frequency distribution as found in the
dataset of the German statistical office in more detail,
however, only about 0.08% of the meinVZ and less than
1% of the XING profiles can be accessed in one minute.
The performance analysis shows that the protection
and accessing time is barely noticeable for a legitimate
user, but, assuming a sensible attribute selection, an at-
tacker needs to invest days into accessing single posts.
This represents a burden none of our considered adver-
saries - crawlers, third party applications, or the OSN
provider - are willing to invest.
7. CONCLUSION
We have introduced PKA, a non-interactive scheme
to protect public OSN data from crawlers. Though it
is not the main application, protection against third-
party applications, OSN providers, and arbitrary indi-
viduals can be achieved. User implicitly select their in-
tended audience and level of security by their choice of
attributes and values. Rather than replacing common
access rules, PKA is an extension to the traditional lay-
ers of friends, friends-of-friends, and strangers, offering
an additional, more fine-grained grouping of contacts.
We have shown that PKA is secure under the assump-
11
tion that the underlying cryptographic primitives - se-
cret sharing scheme, symmetric encryption, and hashing
- are secure. Furthermore, we estimated the number of
trials needed to decrypt one post on the basis of data
crawled from two OSNs. Even with rather unsuitable
attribute choices, access is delayed on the order of min-
utes to days. Our Firefox extension, implementing PKA
as proof of concept, supports the applicability of PKA,
exhibiting negligible delays for legitimate access.
However, the current implementation focuses on pro-
viding the basic functionalities at a high level of secu-
rity rather than usability. We plan on extending its
functionalities to enable the encryption of non-textual
content such as pictures. In addition, it should be easily
possible to encrypt posts with complete previously used
settings, whereas currently it is only possible to reuse
attribute-value pairs. From a conceptional perspective,
we currently evaluate how to use general access secret
sharing [21] for weighted attributes.
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